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TORTS' DOCTRINE OF MUNICIPAL IMMUNITY-
A MYTH
LAWRENCE G. ROPES, JR.*
IrNRODuCrloN
In Florida there is said to be a doctrine that prescribes that a
municipality shall be immune from liability for the tortious lets committed
by its employees acting in the scope of their public duties. It is the
purpose of this article to refute that idea.
Though this doctrine is said to have had its inception under the
common law which was adopted by the Legislature of the State of Florida,'
there is no foundation for this assumption. The State of Florida adopted
the common law as it existed on July 4, 1776. However, the basic case,
Russell v. Men of Devon,2 to which is ascribed this doctrine, was not*
decided until 1788. Therefore, it was never a part of the common law
as that existed at the time of its adoption by Florida. Moreover, the
Russell case did not involve a municipality, but rather, an action against
a county for negligence in failing to keep a bridge in a reasonably safe
condition. The basic reason why the court denied the right of action
was that a "county" was the arm through which the sovereign acted and
the duties placed upon the county were imposed by the sovereign without
the consent of the inhabitants of the county. The court felt that where
these duties were placed upon the county without such consent, to make
the inhabitants liable it would take a legislative act, similar to the
"Statute of Hue and Cry." Further, even if the court could exercise
legislative discretion and hold the inhabitants of the county liable there
would be a great reason for not giving this remedy. As the court said:
... where an action is brought against the corporation for damages,
those damages are not to be recovered against the corporators
in their individual capacity but out of their corporate estate. But
if the County is to be considered a corporation, there is no
corporate fund out of which satisfaction is to be made.
In other words, where mandatory duties were given to the county
without the consent of the populace and without a common fund nor
legal means of obaining one for payment of damages for negligence in
*B.S., B.A., 1941, LL.B., 1950, University of Miami; Member of the Florida Bar;
Member of the American Judicature Society.
1. Bradley v. Jacksonville, 156 Fla. 493, 23 So.2d 626 (1945); Swanson v. Fort
Lauderdale, 155 Fla. 720, 21 So.2d 217 (1945); McCain v. Andrews, 139 F1a. 391, 190
So. 616 (1939).
2. 2 T.R. 667, 12 Eng. Rul. Cas. 694 (1788).
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performing those duties, each inhabitant would be liable. In turn, the
plaintiff in such a case would sue the richest man in the county who
in turn would have to sue the rest of the inhabitants for contribution.
This would result in interminable litigation. The common law would
not impose this burden without a statute requiring it,
COUNTY AND MUNICIPALITY DISTINGUISHED
The Supreme Court of Florida, in "court-made" law, first adopted
the rule laid down for counties in the Russell case and applied it to
municipalities in the famous case of Tallahassee v. Fortune.3  Factually
this case was on all fours with the Russell case, except that it concerned
a municipality rather than a county. However, the city was held liable,
since the duty to repair the public way was given to the city with the
consent of the inhabitants and further, because the city, under its charter,
'had or was supposed to have a common fund out of which damages
could be paid. The common fund was created by the exercise of the
charter power of the city in assessing and collecting taxes and the power
to purchase and hold real, personal and mixed property. The historical
importance of the Fortune case was emphasized by the Supreme Court
in 1924:4
, . . the rule of this State is that announced in the decisions of
the Court from the City of Tallahassee v. Fortune to Kaufman
v. the City of Tallahassee, and to the Maxwell case this day
filed.5
The Fortune case distinguished the difference between aggregate
corporations, such as municipalities, and quasi corporations, such as
counties, in that the powers given counties are without the consent of
the inhabitants whereas the powers given municipalities carry with them
such consent, or may be supposed to have been given with their approval,
since they were given the right to create a common fund resulting from
the exercise of public duties. The municipalities have a proprietary interest
in this common fund; therefore, a statute was not required to make the
municipality liable for neglect of its public duties.
The propriety of drawing ananalogy between the status of a county
and that of a municipality so as to make the law respecting immunity
equally applicable to both is questionable since the two units are easily
distinguishable. These distinctions are made clear in Keggin v. Hillsborough
County,6 where the court elucidated on the differences between counties
and municipalities in their status as governmental units. The county is
3. 3 Fla. 19 (1849).
4. Kaufman v. Tallahassee, 87 Fla. 119, 100 So. 150 (1924).
5 Maxwell v. Miami, 87 Fla, 107, 100 So. 147 (1924); Kaufman v. Tallahassee,
84 Fla. 634, 94 So. 697 (1922); Tallahassee v. Fortune, 3 Fla. 19 (1849).
6. 71 Fla. 356, 71 So. 372 (1916).
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a political subdivision of the state under the Florida Constitution, 7 and
it is not a corporation. It can be created by the state without the
solicitation, consent or concurrence of its inhabitants. It was created
for administrative purposes and is a representative of the sovereignty
of the state. Also, it is an auxilliary to the state, an aid to the more
convenient administration of the government and it is purely political
in characer. On the other hand, one feature which sufficiently distinguishes
municipalities from counties is that municipalities are not political
subdivisions of the state; and the county, under the constitution, being
a mere governmental agency through which many of the functions and
powers of the state are exercised, partakes of the immunity of the state
from liability.8
Whereas the Fortune case laid down the theory of liability of
municipalities for torts committed while in the exercise of public duties,
it remained for another case, Orlando v. Pragg,0 to set up the formula for
applying that theory and to complete the historical development of the
law in regard to this doctrine of immunity. In that case, the city, acting
under its police powers, abated a health nuisance. The lower court held
the city liable, but this decision was reversed by the Supreme Court.
The basis for the reversal was that the city was authorized to abate the
nuisance and the employees abated it in an authorized manner. The
Supreme Court set out its court-adopted rules on the liability of
municipalities for all of its acts:
. . . the law is well settled that municipal corporations can be
held liable for tortious acts that are committed while in the exercise
of some power conferred upon them by law or in the performance
of some duty imposed upon them by law. Where the act which
produces the injury is outside the powers conferred upon the
corporation it cannot be held in damages. A municipal corporation
is liable in damages for a lawful and authorized act of its agents
done in an unauthorized manner, but not for an unlawful or
prohibited act.
Basically this is the law in Florida under stare decisis.
CLASSIFICATION OF CASES
It is possible for all the cases on point in Florida to be classified
under three rules set out in the Pragg case, namely:
Classification I. A municipal corporation is not liable for the
acts of its officers or agents committed pursuant
to an authorized manner.
7. FLA. CONST. Declaration of Rights, § 4.
8. FLA. CoNST. Art. VIII, §§ 1, 2.
9. 31 Fla. Ill, 12 So. 368 (1893).
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Classification IT. A municipal corporation is not liable for the
acts of its officers or agents committed pursuant
to an unlawful or prohibited act.
Classification III. A municipal corporation is liable for the acts
of its officers or agents committed pursuant to
an authorized act, executed in an unauthorized
manner.
Attached to this article is an appendix aligning every case in Florida
on this doctrine into the above three classifications. Although the Supreme
Court has not formally applied this theory to all the cases, the resulting
decisions are in alignment therewith, though, as stated by the court, the
manner of arriving at the result has been inconsistent.'0
The failure of the Supreme Court to follow the rules laid down in
the Pragg case has resulted from a continued "misquoting" of a citation
in that case. The actual citation is:
* . . the law is well settled that municipal corporations can be
held liable for tortious acts that are committed in the exercise
of some power conferred upon them by law or in the performance
of some duty imposed upon them by law."
However, it has been stated as follows:
. . . the law is well settled that municipal corporations can be
held liable for tortious acts that are committed in the exercise
of sonic corporate power conferred upon them by law, or in the
performance of some duty imposed upon them by law. (Italics
supplied)12
The addition of the word "corporate" has been cited in every case in
Florida since the Brown case. The effect is that the theory of immunity
set out in the Pragg case has been changed. It has resulted in a restrictive
meaning, i.e., ministerial or proprietary. Thierefore, the rules set down
in the Pragg case do not encompass public duties of municipalities, but
this cannot be the rule for in that case the city was acting in its public
or governmental capacity, namely, abating a health nuisance. Furthermore,
it is a well recognized rule of law that a municipality has no inherent
powers and therefore, receives all of its powers from its corporate charter;
therefore, all of its duties are by their nature, corporate. To attempt to
restrict the law of the Pragg case, to say that the city gets some of its
powers through incorporation and others through a nebulous right which
is termed "governmental" is incongruous and misleading and contrary to
the law laid down in that decision.
In order to demonstrate the application of the rules in the Pragg and
Fortune cases to later Florida cases, certain cases are set out herein as
10. Avon Park v. Giddens, 158 Fla. 130, 27 So.2d 825 (1946).
11. 31 Fla. 111, 112, 12 So. 368, 369 (1893).
12. Brown v. Eustis, 92 Fia. 931, 110 So. 873 (1926).
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pertinent. In Scott v. Tampa,' suit resulted after police officers entered
a building without a warrant and forcibly ejected the plaintiff. On these
facts the court ruled that the officers had no right to enter the building
and therefore all subsequent injuries resulted from the officers doing an
unathorizcd act. The act of entering the building without a warrant was
ultra vires and thus the case falls in classification I1 supra.
The first case of Kaufman v. Tallahassee14 involved a negligently
operated fire truck which injured the plaintiff. The defense was that the
fire department was performing public duties for which the municipality
was not liable. The Supreme Court at that time showed a disposition
to throw out the entire theory of immunity for cities. However, they did
not go quite so far there, but sent the case back to the lower court for
further consideration in accordance with the rulings of the Supreme Court.
The case eventually was decided in favor of the plaintiff in the lower
court and affirmed on appeal. 15 To overcome the immunity theory, the
court theorized that the duty of running a fire department was permissive
rather than mandatory, that the city was required by law to abate nuisances
and by negligently operating fire trcks it created a nuisance which it
failed to abate. It would have been far more simple and less circuitous
to follow classification III supra.
A second fire truck case was decided at the same time as the Kaufman
case, namely, Maxwell v. Miami;'6 it held the city liable for failure to
abate a nuisance also, and would more easily fall in classification III
supra. The Maxwell case is important for another reason, which reinforces
the theory set out in the Fortune and Pragg cases. There the court said
as a general principle of law:
The public activities of municipalities are by law required to
be performed so as to do no injuries to private rights, that is
not immediately essential to conserve the public peace, health,
safety, morals, and general welfare. This is the limit of police
power.
Any exertion of municipal authority or of the police power
is subject to the provisions of organic law that are designed to
conserve private rights. In the exercise of police power, property
and individual rights may be interfered with, or impaired, or injured,
13. 62 Fla. 275, 55 So. 983 (1914).
14. Kaufman v. Tallahassee, 84 Fla. 634, 94 So. 697 (1922).
15. Kaufman v. Tallahassee, 87 Fla. 119, 100 So. 150 (1924). Followed in
Bradley v. Jacksonville, 156 Fla. 493, 23 So.2d 626 (1945); Miami v. Oates, 152 Fla.
21, 10 So.2d 721 (1942); Miami v. McCorkle, 145 Fla. 109, 199 So. 575 (1941);
Smoak v. Tampa. 123 FHa. 716, 167 So. 528 (1936); Swindal v. Jacksonville, 119 FMa.
338, 161 So. 383 (1935); Vest Palm Beach v. Grimmett, 102 FRa. 680, 137 So. 385(1931); Chardkoff Junk Co. v. Tampa, 102 Fla. 501, 135 So. 457 (1931).
16. 87 Fla. 107, 100 So. 147 (1924). Followed in Miami v. McCorkle, 145 Fla.
109, 199 So. 575 (1941); Swindal v. Jacksonville, 119 Fla. 338, 161 So. 383 (1935);
Chardkoff Junk Co. v. Tampa, 102 Fla. 501, 135 So. 457 (1931); West Palm Beach
v. Crimmett, 102 Fla. 680, 137 So. 385 (1931); Tarpon Springs Lumber & Supply Co.
v. Tarpon Springs, 100 Mla. 314, 129 So. 609 (1930).
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only in the manner and to the extent that is reasonably necessary
to conserve the public good. An unreasonable or unnecessary
exertion of municipal authority or of the police power in the
manner or to the extent in which private, personal, or property
rights are curtailed, or impaired, violates organic law in that it
deprives persons of liberty and property without authority or due
process of law. Municipalities are given police powers to conserve,
not to impair, private rights. The organic law contains limitations
upon police and municipal powers that may be sought to be
conferred by Statute.
In view -of the organic rights to acquire, possess, and protect
property, and to due process and equal protection of the laws, the
principles of non-liability and damnum absque injuria are not
applicable where in the exercise of municipal authority or of the
police power, private, personal, or property rights are interfered
with, injured, or impaired in a manner or to an extent that is
riot reasonably necessary to conserve a public purpose for the
general welfare. 17
It is clear that municipal immunity for torts committed by its employees
while acting in a public capacity, is only a qualified immunity. If the
exercise of the authority is in a manner or to an extent where private,
personal or property rights are interfered with, injured or impaired, to
an extent that is not reasonably necessary to conserve the public purpose
for the general welfare, then it shall be considered actionable, and no
immunity in that situation shall exist for such violation of organic rights.
Next, historically, is the case of Brown v. Eustis,' which is most
frequently quoted by municipal attorneys in setting up the doctrine of
immunity. The basic facts in that case did not materially differ from
the Scott case. In the Eustis case a police officer without warrant or request
entered a store building, arrested the plaintiff who was a guest there and
maliciously assaulted him. On appeal the lower court was affirmed and
the city held blameless on the grounds that the officer had no authority
without a warrant or other authority to enter the building. Therefore,
all the injuries which the plaintiff received were the result of the officer
doing an act ultra vires ab initio. The case may be placed under classification
1I supra, since it merely holds that the city cannot be held liable for
acts committed pursuant to an unlawful or prohibited act.
There was a slight variation of the judicial opinion in Wolf v. Miami.19
There a plaintiff was injured by the negligence of a convict driving an
automobile belonging to a prison foreman who directed the use of the
17.Maxwell v. Miami, 87 Fla. 107, 100 So. 147, 149 (1924).
18. 92 Fla. 931, 110 So. 873 (1926). Followed in Blankenbeck v. Homestead,
44 So.2d 817 (Fla. 1950); Brownlee v. Orlando, 157 Fla. 524, 26 So.2d 504 (1946);
Bradley v. Jacksonville, 156 Mla. 493, 23 So.2d 626 (19451; Phair v. Miami, 155
Fla. 677, 21 So.2d 208 (1945); Kennedy v. Daytona Beach, 152 Fla. 675, 182 So. 228
(1938); Gerschwiller v. Winterhaven, 95 Fla. 427, 115 So. 846 (1928).
19. 103 Fla. 774, 134 So. 539 (1931). Followed in Tampa v. Easton, 145 Fla.
188, 198 So. 753 (1940).
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car to obtain food for the convicts engaged in work under the supervision
and control of municipal authority. Vithout reference to the doctrine
of municipal immunity, the city was held liable on the dangerous
instrumentality doctrine established in Herr v. Butler.20 This was the
first time the dangerous instrumentality doctrine was subjected to
municipal cases. The case, however, could just as easily have been decided
under the Pragg case and would have fallen in classification III supra.
In Ballard v. Tamrpa,21 the city was held liable for the death of a
prisoner due to the negligent or wrongful act of the city in superintending
the prisoner's labor which he was performing under his sentence. The
case falls in classification III and is important since it expresses the
opinion of the court toward the immunity doctrine:
Even in the early days there was a disposition to limit the common
law doctrine of governmental immunity which gave rise to the
saying 'the King can do no wrong but his ministers may.' This
ancient doctrine of immunity has been pruned and pared down
in the last century, especially with regard to municipal corporations
and no court in this land has probably exceeded this court in
participation in that process, at least the doctrine should not be
extended in the face of Section 4 of our Constitutional Declaration
of Rights referred to by Mr. Justice Ellis in the Kaufman case.22
Lewis v. Miami" involved damages for the failure of the city to
segregate a prisoner from another inmate who had a contagious disease.
A state statute requiring segregation formed the basis of liability however, and
the case could have more easily been decided by a more direct means
under the Pragg decision and would come under classification Ill.
The case of Kennedy v. Daytona Beach24 is a famous and familiar
case cited by attorneys claiming immunity for the municipality for torts
committed by employees while acting in their public capacity. The
question on appeal in this case:
Was the lower court correct in holding that the plaintiff in error's
sole remedy for a false imprisonment and/or assault and battery
at the hands of the defendant in error's police officer was an action
solely against the police officer and not the defendant in error city
in spite of the fact that the city was being operated under the
commission-manager theory of municipal organization? 25
In answering in the affirmative, the court cited the Eustis case and again
used the word "corporate" in misquoting the famous Pragg citation. Since
20. 101 Fla. 1125, 132 So. 815 (1931); Followed in Tampa v. Easton, 145 FMa.
188, 198 So. 753 (1940).
21. 124 Fla. 457, 168 So. 654 (1936).
22. Id. at 657.
23. 127 Fla. 426, 173 So. 150 (1937).
24. 132 Fla. 675, 182 So. 228 (1938).
25. Id. at 229.
MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
the Kennedy case followed the Eustis case, it would have to fall in
classification 11, an act ultra vires ab initio.
In McCain v. Andrews, 26 the city employed an investigator to study
fires of an incendiary nature. He arrested and prosecuted the plaintiff.
The charge was dismissed and the plaintiff sued the city for malicious
prosecution, but the city was held not liable. However, a slight inconsistency
crops out in the rulings of the court in the case for it was based on
the precedents set out by the Eustis, Pragg, Kennedy and Ballard cases
supra.
If we say that the case was based on the Pragg case, we are actually
deciding that the city could not be held liable for a lawful act executed
in a lawful manner. This is most likely for the court commented in the
instant case that since there was no "specification as to the manner in which
the plaintiff was injured," there was no action against the city, therefore
there must have been an authorized manner and there was no evidence
to the contrary. The case then would fall in classification 1.
If we say the case falls under the rulings of the Eustis and Kennedy
cases we must by force of stare decisis say the case falls in classification
II-that the city could not be liable for an unlawful act ab initio. If
this be true, then we would have to say the investigator had no authority
to arrest the plaintiff and then the city would not be liable. It is
doubtful if these cases are controlling.
If we say the case falls tinder the rulings of the Ballard case, we
certainly become confused for there the city was held liable on the theory
it was maintaining a nuisance and since the city in the McCain case was
held not liable certainly the Ballard case would not apply.
Though the court, by dictum, in the McCain case seems to indicate
that a city cannot be held liable for a tort committed in the exercise
of police powers, this statement is too all inclusive and is contrary to
the Fortune and Pragg cases. The court seemed to be giving the city
the status of a county, or quasi corporation, on the facts involved which is
also contrary to the Keggin case.
The case of Palm Beach v. Vlahos"7 involved an appeal from a judgment
for the plaintiff who was struck by a city car driven by a fire chief.
Certain pleas of the plaintiff in error were stricken on demurrer. These
pleas were addressed to the third count of the declaration and alleged
that at the time and place of the accident the fire chief was not using
the car on city business. On appeal, the decision of the lower court
striking these pleas was reversed on the ground that the pleas presented
issues which, if proven, would result in a verdict for' the plaintiff in
26. 139 Fla. 391, 190 So. 616 (1939).
27. 153 Fla. 781, 15 So.2d 839 (1943).
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error since the city could not be held liable for an ultra vires act. This
case would fall in classification II if it were proven on retrial that the
acts of the fire chief were ultra vires, or if not so proven, then classification
III would obtain and the city would be liable.
In Bradley v. Jacksonville,2 there was a per curian1 decision based on
the Eustis and Kennedy cases. In a concurring opinion, Justice Brown
said:
The doctrine of municipal immunity for. torts committed by its
employees engaged in governmental functions comes down to us
as part of the common law, which was adopted by the Legislature.
If that common law is to be repealed, it would appear to be a
legislative function. (38 Am. Jur. 265, 272, 317.)2§
The above citation, is one which relates to the Russell v. Men of Devon
case heretofore mentioned. The ruling in the Russell case concerned
counties or quasi corporations which were without a common fund to
pay damages. It inferred that if it did have a common fund it could
be held liable and this was affirmed in the Fortune case. rIherefore the
citation does not apply to municipal corporations under the common
law, it having been shown previously in this article that this doctrine
did not exist at the time of the adoption by the Supreme Court of Florida
of the common law of England. Further, legislation would only be
necessary if the duties placed on the municipalities were mandatory and
the city was without a common fund as heretofore pointed out.
In Avon Park v. Giddens0 the plaintiff was injured by a police car
driven by an officer assisting the police chief in bringing in a prisoner.
The city was held liable. As a result, the case falls in classification III.
The court attempted in the Avon Park case to analyze the previous cases
on municipal immunity and admitted in its opinion, in effect, that their
decisions were somewhat inconsistent. The case is important for the
reason that it indicated that the court appears to be in a quandry about
the immunity questions and that it has failed, in fact, at times to classify
the cases. It seems that as to this so-called classification between
corporate and governmental areas, the simplest pattern to follow is the
classifications set forth in the Pragg case. Confusion occurs when the
court seeks to apply that immunity given quasi corporations under the
common law, as set out in the Russell and Fortune cases, to municipal
corporations of the present day which did not even exist in their modern
conception at the time of the common law, and which under the Fortune
case were termed aggregate corporations.
28. 156 Fla. 493, 23 So.Zd 626 (1945).
29. Ibid.
30. 158 Fla. 130, 27 So.2d 825 (1946).
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Coodwin v. Tampa 3 is a purely per curium decision. However, there
was a lengthy dissent written by Justice Chapman. Under the facts of
that case, as stated by the dissent, we find the following: An incompetent,
a prisoner in the city stockade under a fifteen year sentence, was shot
and killed by a guard during an attempted escape. The defense of the
city was based on the theory that since the officer was acting in a purely
governmental or sovereign capacity, the city was not liable. The court's
affirmance was based on the following Florida decisions: the Eustis,
Gerschwiller, Kennedy, Bradley, and Brownlee cases, as well as decisions
from other jurisdictions. Justice Chapman based his dissent on Florida
Statutes Section 784.05 which provides a criminal penalty for the negligent
or careless injury to others. He concluded that police officers were not
excepted from that provision. His opinion also claimed the cases relied
on by the majority were not on point, whereas the Lewis, Kaufman, Maxwell
and Ballard cases were more applicable.
In analyzing the cases cited by the majority of the court we find that
the Bradley, Gerschwiller, Brownlee and Kennedy cases were based on the
Eustis holding. Therefore, the only rule of stare decisis which need be
considered in determining the correctness of the decision is the law of
the Eustis case.
The Eustis case should not apply, however, for under those facts the
officers acted unlawfully and without cover of authority. The city's defense
in the instant case, as stated, was that the officer was acting with lawful
authority and with cover of office. Since the Eustis rule could not have
been applied here, and since the court by its own statement in the Ballard
case asserts, and rightfully so, that probably no court in the nation has
exceeded this court in its participation in the process of pruning and
paring down the ancient doctrine of immunity with regard to municipal
corporations, it would seem that greater weight should have been given
to the Eustis decision. Thus, since the city's defense was based on the
defense of immunity while acting lawfully in the scope of authority, the
decision of this court was not based on the proper case.
In analyzing the cases of Justice Chapman we find they embrace
the following questions: (1) Was more force used than was necessary
to violate organic law? (2) Did the act violate Section 4 of the Declaration
of Rights? and (3) Did the act violate Florida Statutes Section 784.05?
If any, all or a combination of the above questions could be answered
affirmatively by the jury, then under the historical development of the law
on this question, Justice Chapman was right and the case would have
fallen under classification III.
31. 48 So.2d 164 (Fla. 1950).
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Ilie last and most current cases involving the immunity doctrine are
those of Miami v. Bethel32 and Williams v. Green Cove Springs.33 These
cases are important because they indicate a disposition on the part of
three members of the Supreme Court of Florida to deny immunity to a
municipality in cases falling in classification III. Thcsc may be key
decisions in Florida opening the wedge in the doctrine of immunity.
In the Bethel case, police officers descended on a dice game and the
participants ran into a poolroom. One of the officers went into the
poolroom and accused the plaintiff of participating in the game. However,
under the facts found by the Supreme Court, the plaintiff had left the
dice game before the officers arrived. The officer accusing the plaintiff
laid hands upon him, brought him outside the poolroom and held him
while another officer beat the plaintiff and injured him. The question on
appeal was whether the city was liable for the beating. The court found
the city was not liable on the basis of the Kennedy case, which in turn
was based on the Eustis case. Therefore, the court had to find under
stare decisis that the officers had no authority to enter the poolroom and
lay hands on the plaintiff, since the officer had not seen the plaintiff
in the dice game, thus making all injuries received by the plaintiff resulting
from the acts of the officers an act illegal ab initio.
The dicta of the affirming judges in the above case seems to indicate
that cities can never be held liable while their employees are exercising
public duties. However, this is contrary to the Florida Constitution
Declaration of Rights Section 4 which provides:
All courts in this state shall be open, so that every person for
any injury done him in his lands, goods, person, or reputation
shall have remedy, by due course of law, and right and justice
shall be administered without sale, denial, or delay.
The dicta announced by the Supreme Court is also contrary to the
general provisions of law heretofore set out in the citation from the
Maxwell case, to the effect that the principles of damnum absque injuria
do not apply where organic rights are violated by the exercise of police
powers in an unreasonable manner. Furthermore in the Pragg case there
was a clear exercise of police powers which were exercised in a reasonable
manner; therefore, there was no liability on the part of the city. However,
had the manner been unreasonable the city would have been liable under
the rules adopted in that case.
In the Williams case recovery was denied a wife for the death of
her husband, a prisoner, who died in a fire of undetermined origin which
32. 65 Sold 34 (Fl. 1953).
33. 65 So.2d 56 (Fla. 1953).
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consumed the city jail. Under the classifications herein set out, the city
would not be liable for there was no showing as to the manner iii which
the fire was negligently started by the employees of the city and in the
absence of such a showing there was no liability and the case would fall
in classification I. However, the Supreme Court stated that its decision
of non-liability of the city was based on Elrod v. Daytona Beach 34 and
Lewis v. Miami. 5 This presents an incongruous situation.
In the Elrod case the city was held not liable for passage and
enforcement of an unconstitutional ordinance. Since the city was without
power to enact such an ordinance, it was not liable for acts thereunder.
Though the dicta in that case seems to say the basis for non-liability
was the fact that the city was enforcing a police regulation and therefore
could not be held liable, the legal basis was that the passage of the
ordinance was ultra vires. Any other reasoning would be contrary to the
Pragg and Fortune cases and the principles of organic law set out in the
Maxwell decision. If the court in the Williams case based its ruling on the
dicta of the Elrod case the ruling is crroneous. The case might more
properly have been decided on the law in the case of Avey v. West Paln
Beach,6 which involved an automobile accident between the plaintiff and
a third party because a stop-and-go signal light of the city was out of
order. The city was held not liable on the ground that there was no
cvidcnce produced to show that the city had any knowledge of the disorder
of the traffic light and in the absence of such evidence, the case falls in
classification I.
In the Lewis case, the city was held liable for failing to segregate
a prisoner from one who had a venereal disease. If the Williams case
was based on the law in the Lewis case, the city would be liable on the
grounds of a lawful act of imprisonment and an unauthorized manner of
care of the prisoner. Since the city was held not liable, it is doubtful
that the Lewis case was controlling.
Te dissent of Justice Terrell in the Williams 7 case is in favor of
holding municipalities liable for lawful acts performed in an unauthorized
manner and this thought is concurred in by Justice Hobson and Chief
Justice Roberts.
CONCLUSION
Substantive law requires that a city be held liable for a lawful act
performed in an unauthorized manner. The law now permits recovery
34. 132 Fla. 24, 180 So. 378 (1938).
35. 127 Fla. 426, 173 So. 150 (1937).
36. 152 Fla. 717, 12 So.2d 881 (1943).
37. 65 So.2d 56, 58 (Fla, 1953).
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in such cases against the city and ultimately its taxpayers and citizens-
not as individuals-but as beneficiaries of a common fund. These same
citizens and taxpayers who pay the city employees for their public
functions have a right to be critical of their acts and if they act
in a manner which tends to violate organic rights, these same citizens
and taxpayers should have action. If we deny the action, municipal
employees under their public powers may, act in effect, with impunity.
Many judgments against the municipality in such instances would result
in a strict supervision over the manner of exercise of public duties by its
employees. The trend toward support of this theory is established by the
lengthy dissents in the Bethel and Williams cases.
APPENDIX
LIABILITY OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS IN TORT CASES3 8
A. Theory of Liability
a. Tallahassee v. Fortune, 3 Fla. 19 (1849)
I. A city is an aggregate corporation with a common fund.
2. A county is a quasi corporation without a common fund.
b. A quasi corporation under the common law was not liable for
tort because:
1. They are invested with powers without consent of inhabitants;
2. They have no corporate fund;
3. They have no legal means of obtaining a corporate fund;
4. Without a fund each corporator would be liable.
an. This burden the common laws would not impose without
statute.
bb. But in regular corporations which have or may be
supposed to have a corporate fund, this reasoning does
not apply.
i. Tallahassee is an aggregate corporation which has, or
may be supposed to have a common fund, because:
aaa. It has the power of assessing and collecting
taxes.
bbb. It has the power to purchase and hold real,
personal and mixed property.
cc. As a result, Tallahassee and cities may be held liable in tort.
38. Cases in which a county rather than a municipality was involved: Keggin v.
Hillsborough County, 71 Fla. 356, 71 So. 372 (1916); Russell v. Men of Devon, 2 T.R.
667, 12 Eng. Rul. Cas. 694 (1788).
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B. Determination of Liability
a. Orlando v. Pragg, 31 Fla. 111, 12 So. 368 (1893).
1. A municipal corporation is not liable for tortious acts committed
by its officers and agents, unless the acts complained of were
committed in the exercise of some power conferred upon it
by law, or in the performance of some duty imposed upon it
by law.
2. Such a corporation is liable for a lawful and unauthorized act
of its agents done in an unauthorized maner, but not for an
unlawful or prohibited act.
3. It is possible for all the cases on point in Florida to be placed
in one of three categories:
I. Not liable for authorized act executed in lawful and
authorized manner:
Williams v. Green Cove Springs, 65 So.2d 56 (Fla. 1953).
Avery v. West Palm Beach, 152 Fla. 717, 12 So.2d 881 (1943).
MeCain v. Andrews, 139 Fla. 391, 190 So. 616 (1939).
Orlando v. Pragg, 31 Fla. 111, 12 So. 368 (1893).
Ii. Not liable for unlawful or prohibited act:
Miami v. Bethel, 65 So.2d 34 (Fla. 1953).
Blankenbeck v. Homestead, 44 So.2d 817 (Fla. 1950).
Brownlce v. Orlando, 157 FIa. 524, 26 So.2d 504 (1946).
Bradley v. Jacksonville, 156 Fla. 493, 23 So.2d 626 (1945).
Swanson v. Fort Lauderdale, 155 Fla. 720, 21 So.2d 217 (1945).
Phair v. Miami, 155 Fla. 677, 21 So.2d 208 (1945).
Palm Beach v. Vlahos, 184 Fla. 159, 15 So.2d 839 (1943).
McCain v. Andrews, 139 Fla. 391, 190 So. 616 (1939).
Kennedy v. Daytona Beach, 132 Fla. 675, 182 So. 228 (1938).
Elrod v. Daytona Beach, 132 Fla. 24, 180 So. 378 (1938).
Gcrschwiller v. Winter Haven, 95 Fla. 427, 115 So. 846 (1928).
Brown v. Eustis, 92 Fla. 931, 110 So. 873 (1926).
Scott v. Tampa, 62 Fla. 275, 55 So. 983 (1914).
111. Liable for lawful and authorized act performed in
unauthorized manner:
Goodwin v. Tampa, 48 So.2d 164 (1950).
Avon Park v. Giddens, 158 Fla. 130, 27 So.2d 825 (1946).
Palm Beach v. Vlahos, 184 Fla. 159, 15 So.2d 839 (1943).
Miami v. Oathcs, 152 Fla. 21, 10 So.2d 721 (1942).
Barth v. Miami 146 Fla. 542, 1 So.2d 574, 578-579 (1941).
Miami v. McCorkle, 145 Fla. 109, 199 So. 575 (1941).
Tampa v. Easton, 145 Fla. 188, 198 So. 753 (1940).
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Lewis v. Miami, 127 Fla. 426, 173 So. 150 (1937).
Ballard v. Tampa, 124 Fla. 457, 168 So. 654 (1936).
Smoak v. Tampa, 123 Fla. 716, 167 So. 528 (1936).
Swindall v. Jacksonville, 119 Fla. 338, 161 So. 383 (1935).
West Palm Beach v. Crimmett, 102 Fla. 680, 137 So. 385 (1931).
Chardkoff Junk Co. v. Tampa, 102 Fla. 501, 135 So. 457 (1931).
Wolfe v. Miami, 103 Fla. 774, 134 So. 539 (1931).
Tarpon Sprngs Lumber & Supply Co. v. Tarpon Springs, 100 Fla.
314, 129 So. 609 (1930).
Kaufman v. Tallahassee, 87 Fla. 119, 100 So. 150 (1924).
Maxwell v. Miami, 87 Fla. 107, 100 So. 147 (1924).
Kaufman v. Tallahassee, 84 Fla. 634, 94 So. 697 (1922).
Tallahassee v. Fortune, 3 Fla. 19 (1849).
